

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 072516
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARN:MDRAPER/IO/UNP:JLORENZ
APPROVED BY IO:CWMAYNES
NEA:ALATHERTONJR
IO/UNP:TNILES
S/S-O:TGMARTIN

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O 212016Z MAR 78 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK NIACT
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 072516

EXDIS

CORRECTED COPY (LINE 1 PARA 7 OMITTED)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PBOR,MARR, UN, IS, LE

SUBJECT: SOUTHERN LEBANON

REF: DEPARTMENT TELECONS WITH AMBASSADORS LEONARD AND
PARKER, AND CONGEN NEWLIN

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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APPROVED BY:NEA/ARN:MDRAPER

S/S-O:TMARTIN

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INFO RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 072516

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 072516 ACTION USUN NEW YORK, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, JERUSALEM, AMMAN, JIDDA, CAIRO, KUWAIT, LUSAKA
INFO TEL AVIV MAR 21.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 072516

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOL RPT STATE 072516 ACTION USUN NY BEIRUT DAMASCUS JERUSALEM
AMMAN JIDDA CAIRO KUWAIT INFO TEL AVIV 21 MAR 78 QUOTE

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 (ISO) R

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DRAFTED BY IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY IO/UNA:AFHOLLOWAY

S/S-O:JTOBIN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LUSAKA IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 072516

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CONDITIONAL ON TOTAL ISRAELI SATISFACTION WITH ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING THE SYRIANS. VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 21 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 20 Mar 2014
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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From: STATE
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Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Retention: 0
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3251940
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOUTHERN LEBANON
TAGS: PBOR, MARR, IS, LE, UN, UNIFIL
To: USUN NEW YORK BEIRUT MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/642661c0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
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Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014